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RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY
Arnold H. Loewy*
Cases involving the Establishment of Religion Clause predominantly
emphasize religiousneutrality. Believingthis to be normatively correct,Professor
Loewy arguesfor religious neutralityin capitalpunishment cases. In accordance
therewith, he would uphold religious peremptory challenges where a juror's
religious belief is related to her death penalty perspective. Professor Loewy
agrees with the courts'generalwillingness to disallow religionas an aggravating
factor while allowing it as a mitigatingfactor. This dichotomy comports with the
neutralityprinciplebecause aggravatingfactors, in general,are limited whereas
mitigatingfactors are unlimited.

PROLOGUE
I was not asked to comment on the death penalty as such, but inasmuch as
others have expressed an opinion of opposition to capital punishment, I do not wish
to have my silence construed as disagreement. As a philosophical matter, I am
opposed to capital punishment, especially as it is administered today.' As a
constitutional matter, a fairly persuasive argument can be made that capital
punishment is cruel and unusual.' If I might give a two-word reason for my
* Graham Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law. The
author is grateful for the research assistance of Edgar Page and Shawn Fraley.
For example, in Illinois, Governor Ryan recently called for a capital punishment
moratorium after thirteen death row inmates were found to be factually innocent. See Dirk
Johnson, Illinois,CitingFaulty Verdicts, Bars Executions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1,2000, at A 1.
Unfortunately, this does not appear to be an isolated incident. See JIM DWYER, PETER
NEUFELD & BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND
OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000).
2 First of all, capital punishment is cruel in the dictionary sense of the term. Marching

a prisoner off to be killed by the state is at least as cruel as whipping or stockades. Second,
it is unnecessarily cruel in that there is no punitive purpose that cannot be obtained as well,
or nearly as well, by less cruel methods.
I reject the argument that death is not cruel and unusual because it has become
sufficiently frequent to be usual. Surely, a state could not make boiling a person in oil
constitutional by imposing forty such sentences in a week.
Finally, I rejectthe argument propounded by Justice Scalia, among others, that because
capital punishment was recognized when the Constitution was adopted, it cannot be
forbidden by implication. See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141 (1994) (mem.). While
concurring in the denial of a writ of certiorari, Scalia wrote:
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opposition, it would be "Billy Moore." 3
I. RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY
In assessing the interrelationship between religion and the death penalty, I start
with the Establishment of Religion Clause4 and the cases construing it. Although
the Court occasionally refers to "separation" 5 or "accommodation" 6 as guiding
principles of Establishment Clause construction, the dominant theme of the Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been neutrality.7 By neutrality, the Court
means evenhandedness, neither favoring nor disfavoring religion. This concept is
embodied in such phrases as "neither advance nor inhibits,"' or more recently, does
not "endorse or disapprove." 9
Neutrality does not, however, mean irrelevancy. A religious perspective
can prevail so long as it is not favored over a nonreligious perspective. Thus,
religious institutions may be given a tax exemption so long as comparably
situated nonreligious entities (e.g., fraternal or benevolent organizations) are
similarly treated.'0 Also, Sunday closing laws can be justified if supported by
The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a
capital ... crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury,... nor
be deprived of life ... without due process of law." This clearly permits the

death penalty to be imposed, and establishes beyond doubt that the death penalty
is not one of the "cruel and unusual punishments" prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment.
Id; see also Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 368-70 (1989); Thompson v. Oklahoma,
dissenting). In my view, mention of capital punishment
487 U.S. 815, 864 (1987) (Scalia, J.,

in such clauses as the Grand Jury and Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment, merely
indicates the process to be followed to the extent that capital punishment is permissible. It
does not indicate a considered judgment that capital punishment is necessarily consistent
with the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.
3 Billy Moore was the luncheon speaker at this conference. He is currently a minister
whose principal mission is ministering to troubled youth. He spent sixteen years on death
row and, on more than one occasion, was nearly executed. Had that happened, we would all
be poorer for it.
. 4 "Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion .... ." U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
See, e.g., Illinois exrel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211,232 (1948).
6 See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1952).
7 See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,214-15 (1963); Arnold H. Loewy,
Rethinking GovernmentNeutrality Towards Religion Underthe EstablishmentClause: The
Untapped PotentialofJustice O'Connor'sInsight, 64 N.C. L. REv. 1049 (1986).

' Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,612 (1971) (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S.
236, 243 (1968)).
9 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,56 (1985) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
'0See Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664,673 (1970); cf Tex. Monthly v. Bullock, 489
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nonreligious reasons.'"
One reason for requiring neutrality (especially in regard to capital punishment)
is the inability to contradict religion by ordinary logic. For example, if one
believes that God supports an eye for an eye, she will not be persuaded by the
power of a contrary philosophical approach. Deific decrees are simply not
amenable to philosophical refutation. Consequently, a prosecutorial or defense
reference to the Bible should be accompanied by a judicial admonition that the
Bible is not the law.
My focus will be on jury selection, religion as an aggravating circumstance,
religion as a mitigating circumstance, and gubernatorial pardons.
II. JURY SELECTION
Typically, jury selection questions arise when a juror belongs to a religious
group that the prosecutor believes opposes capital punishment. In the easy case,
where the juror concedes that her religious beliefs render it impossible for her to
impose the death penalty, the juror may be excused for cause.. This is a religiously
neutral rule because the excusal for cause follows regardless of the source of the
opposition. Whether it be religious or secular, one whose scruples preclude the
imposition of the death penalty may be excused for cause. 2
The harder question involves a juror who belongs to a religion that hesitates to
judge others, but who states no categorical opposition to the death penalty. Such
ajuror may not be dismissed for cause. 3 But may she be peremptorily challenged?
Peremptory challenges on the basis of race or gender are, of course, forbidden. 4
Is religion different, or should it be?
The cases are split, and thus far the Supreme Court has refused to consider the
question.' 5 It typically arises in cases in which a religious reason is proffered to
overcome what would otherwise appear to be an unconstitutional racial challenge.
In State v. Davis,6 the prosecution sought to explain its peremptory challenge of a
U.S. 1, 14-15 (1989) (holding that the Texas sales tax exemption for religious periodicals
was too narrow to be permissible under the First Amendment Establishment Clause. To be
constitutional, the Court held, the benefit must be accessible for some non-religious entities).
" See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,445 (1961). I sometimes tell my class that
the Court's rationale in McGowan was that if God came down tomorrow and told us that as
far as He was concerned we could all work on Sunday, the labor unions would still insist on
Sundays off (or at least time and a half for working Sundays).
12 See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 175-76 (1986).
'3 See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519-22 (1968).
'4 See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 130-31, 139-40 (1994) (gender); Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (race).
's See State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993), cert. denied 511 U.S. 1115 (1994).
16 See id. Although Davis was not a capital case, it raises the same principles.
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black juror on the ground that he was a Jehovah's Witness. 7 The prosecutor
contended that Jehovah's Witnesses do not like to sit in judgment of their fellow
man.18 Although agreeing that a peremptory challenge based on religion without
more would be invalid, the court upheld this peremptory challenge because it
found the explanation of Jehovah's Witnesses' beliefs sufficiently related to the
case to justify the challenge.' 9
State v. Thorson,2" on the other hand, reversed a death sentence because one of
the jurors was peremptorily challenged on the basis of her membership in the
Holiness Church, a church whose members, according to the prosecutor, could not
sit in judgment of others.2' Relying on a state constitutional provision precluding
religious preference, the Mississippi Supreme Court found exclusive reliance on
the juror's religion to be reversible error.22
Which view is better? Frankly, the question is close. Under the Davis view,
members of some religious groups could be subject to systematic peremptory
challenges. The prospect of some religious sects never being represented on a
criminal jury is not pretty. Furthermore, as the Thorson court emphasized, a juror
from one of the nonjudgmental sects could be excluded if she were asked if she
personally could sit in judgment of her fellow man, notwithstanding the religious
admonition to the contrary, and could be excused if her answer were "no." 23 In
view of this more precise alternative to the rather blunt instrument of excluding all
Jehovah's Witnesses or Holiness Church members, there is much force to
Thorson's requirement of individual incapacity vis-a-vis presumed group
incapacity.
Notwithstanding the power of these arguments, I believe that Davis got it right.
Religion is inherently tied to belief in a way that race and sex are not.
Furthermore, according to Georgia v. McCollum,24 peremptory challenges
forbidden to the prosecution are also forbidden to the defense. Thus, if Thorson
were to prevail, what would become of a black defendant faced with a potential
juror from the Aryan Church who claims that, notwithstanding his church's
teachings, he could give a black man a fair trial? Would we want to saddle a
" See id.
at 768, 772.
11See id.
at 768.
19 See id.
at 770-72.
20 721 So. 2d 590 (Miss. 1998).
at 593-95.
21 See id.
22 See id It did, however, uphold the striking of another juror of the same faith on the
ground that an additional reason had been given to strike her, thus rendering the religious
at 595 n.6.
reason harmless error. See id.
23 See id.
at 595 ("The critical question.., was whether or not she felt that she could sit
in judgment of her fellow man regardless of the position of the Holiness Faith.").
24 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
25 See id.
at 48-50.
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defendant with such a juror with not even a peremptory challenge to save him? I
hope not, but by combining Thorson and McCollum it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to prevent. Thus, I support allowing religious peremptory challenges.
This position accords with my theme of neutrality. Certainly one could base
peremptory challenges on club membership. I assume that one could be
peremptorily challenged from a capital case because he belongs to "Citizens
Against the Death Penalty." Peremptorily challenging one who b~longs to a
religion believing the same thing is not all that different.
III. RELIGION AS AN AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE

One cannot read cases pertaining to religion as an aggravating circumstance
without getting the impression that prosecutors are equal opportunity religion
attackers. The cases in this section involve prosecutorial comment on Satanism,
Christianity, Islam, and Judaism. Although not all of the cases were capital cases,
the principle of each is applicable to capital cases. In three of these cases, the
religious reference was cause for conviction or sentence reversal. In the fourth
case, the religious reference was condemned, but the conviction upheld because of
curative instructions from the trial court.
In the Satanism case, Flanagan v. State,26 Dale Flanagan and his friend,
Randolph Moore, murdered Flanagan's grandparents in order to collect insurance
proceeds and an inheritance."7 In an effort to obtain the death penalty, the
prosecutor offered evidence of the defendants' membership in a satanic cult.2" The
Nevada Supreme Court reversed the death sentences on the ground that the free
exercise of Satanism could not be penalized in the absence of proof that the
religious practice, as opposed to greed, motivated the killings.29
The court's reasoning comported with the neutrality thesis espoused herein.
Relying on the Supreme Court case of Dawson v. Delaware," the Nevada Supreme
Court held that the constitutionally-protected activity could be punished only if it
directly contributed to the crime.3' Dawson involved a member of an Aryan
supremacy group who escaped from prison.32 After escaping, he stole a car and
killed its owner, who happened to be a caucasian woman." Because his Aryan
beliefs were unrelated to the killing, the Court held that the First Amendment was

26

846 P.2d 1053 (Nev. 1993).
id at 1055.

217See
28
29
30

31
32

See id.
See id. at 1058-59.

503 U.S. 159 (1992).
See id. at 164-68.
See id at 160.

" See id. at 161.
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violated by reference to Dawson's beliefs.34 The Court in Dawson sharply
distinguished Barclay v. Florida," where the beliefs of a black supremacist were
held relevant because he chose his victim on the basis of race.36
Justice Steffan dissented in Flanaganon two grounds. First, he argued that
because Satanism was a generic commitment to evil, the killings, being evil, were
the product of his beliefs." He distinguished Dawson on the ground that racism
was a specific evil vis-a-vis Satanism, which was more general.3" Although not
without force, I believe that tarring a group as generically evil, thereby rendering
membership in it always relevant as an aggravating factor, guts the First
Amendment precision that Dawson endeavored to draw.
Justice Steffan's second argument was that because of Satanism's devotion to
unmitigated evil, it should not be recognized as a religion for purposes of the
religion clauses. 9 I believe that this reasoning fails for two reasons. First, it is
surely anathematic to the First Amendment for courts to accord religious status to
only those religions that comport with a judge's sense of propriety. Second, even
if Satanism were not a religion, under neutrality principles, it would be entitled to
protection as a philosophical belief.4' Thus, I conclude that Flanaganwas rightly
decided.4
Even Christians are sometimes met by prosecutorial wrath. In State v.
Wangberg,42 the prosecution sought to negate the defendant's insanity 'claim by
focusing on his minister father's Christianity. 3 The prosecutor argued: "Now,
there is another law, a higher law than that of our state law, and that is a law that
Pastor Wangberg has taught his son, I am sure only too well; 'Thou shalt not kill.'
In reversing Wangberg's conviction, the court
The fifth commandment."

at 168.
3 See id.
35463 U.S. 939 (1983).
36 See Dawson, 503 U.S. at 166-67.
See Flanagan v. State, 846 P.2d 1053, 1060 (Nev. 1993) (Steffan, J., dissenting).
38 See id at 1059-60.
39See id at 1061.
40 See, e.g., Dawson, 503 U.S. at 166-67.
" The prosecutor argued that it could introduce evidence of Satanism to rebut the
defendant's claim that he had converted to Christianity. See Flanagan,846 P.2d at 1057.
Unfortunately for the prosecutor's claim, the defendant did not introduce his conversion
Thus, his "[b]ut I was just
until afterthe prosecutor presented the Satanism argument. See id.
rebutting the defendant's evidence" argument was rightly rejected. See generally John H.
Blume and Sheri Lynn Johnson, Don't Take His Eye, Don't Take His Tooth, and Don 't Cast
the First Stone: Limiting Religious Arguments in Capital Cases, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 61 (2000).
42 136 N.W.2d 853 (Minn. 1965).
43 See id, at 854.
44

Id.at 854-55.
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disapproved of this and other biblical references.45
Had the court admonished the jury that the law of Minnesota, and not the
prosecutor's opinion of the law of God, governed this case, a fairly powerful
argument could have been made for affirmance. However, the opinion does not
indicate that any such curative instruction was given. Consequently, the court's
reversal of the conviction was appropriate. And, although not a capital case, the
Wangberg logic surely would apply to an attempt to invoke religion in support of
the death penalty.
In Commonwealth v. Mahdi," it was Islam's turn to feel the prosecutor's heat
in a robbery/murder case. The prosecutor argued as follows:
You know what explains this, don't you, this whole killing and
everything else? They talk about the Islamic religion. This is
what it is. Who is the colored man? The Caucasian Jacob's
made devil, skunk of the [planet] earth .... That's what they
thought of the Ladners,. . . and they eliminated these two men,
and felt that they'd really succeeded in pulling off the robbery
of the year. .. 4
Holding that "[a]ppeals to racial, religious, or ethnic prejudices are especially
incompatible with the concept of a fair trial because of the likelihood that such
references will 'sweep jurors beyond a fair and calm consideration of the
evidence,"' 48 the court rightly reversed Mahdi's conviction.
Finally, in United States v. Goldman,49 the prosecutor called attention to the
defendant's yarmulke, formally suggesting that the jury not be prejudiced against
the defendant for wearing it, but suggesting that the "religious symbol that this man
wears has been defamed, defiled, and scandalized."50 Whether the prosecutor was
4 See id. at 855. The prosecutor also said:
Does the Bible make any excuse for a man who has blood on his hands? Did
God excuse Cain when he killed his brother Abel? It is true that God did not
consult perhaps with any psychiatrists. He didn't know Cain was suffering
schizophrenia, delusions, hallucinations, paranoia, but I wonder if this makes
any difference in the eyes of God. Neither the laws of the State of Minnesota
or the law of our God makes any excuse for killing, for a killing such as the
defendant, Paul Wangberg, committed on the evening of February 17, 1962.
We are all subject to these same laws, be it God's law or the law of the State of
Minnesota, and being we farmer, lawyer, doctor or pastor's son.
Id. at 854-55.
46 448 N.E.2d 704 (Mass. 1983).
47 Id. at 712.
4" Id. at 713 (quoting Commonwealth v. Graziano, 368 Mass. 325, 332 (1975)).
'9 563 F.2d 501 (1st Cir. 1977).
'o Id. at 504.
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seeking to inflame anti- or pro-Jewish sentiment (or both), the court rightly found
the remarks highly prejudicial. However, because the trial judge explicitly
instructed the jury that neither religion nor attire was relevant to its deliberations,
the court affirmed the conviction. 5
IV. RELIGION AS A MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE
Unlike its use as an aggravator, religion as a mitigator is almost universally
accepted.52 The federal capital punishment statute has been construed to allow for
religious experiences to be considered when offered by the defendant in
mitigation." Indeed, research has disclosed no case in which a defendant was not
permitted to use his religious beliefs as a mitigating circumstance. The issue
arises, most commonly, when a defendant's religious beliefs are found to be
insufficient mitigation by the jury. Typically in such a case, the defendant appeals
the death sentence and the appellate court determines that the jury was justified in
imposing the death penalty notwithstanding the defendant's religious character.54
These decisions follow the principle of religious neutrality. If there is one
fixed star in capital punishment jurisprudence, it is that aggravation is limited55 and
mitigation is unlimited.56 Thus, by consistently allowing evidence of religion as a
5'See id at 505.
52

See, e.g., Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 186(1988) (O'Connor, J. and Blackmun,

J., concurring in judgment) ("[R]eligious devotion might demonstrate positive character
traits that might mitigate against the death penalty."). See generallyUnited States v. Cooper,
91 F. Supp. 2d 90 (D.D.C. 2000) (affirming that jurors may consider any mitigating factors
when determining whether to apply the death penalty).
53 Federal Death Penalty Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591-3598. See, e.g., United States v.
Webster, 162 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 1999); Cooper, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 101; United States v.
Cuff, 38 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); United States v. Davis, 904 F. Supp. 554 (E.D.
La. 1995).
"' See, e.g., Weeks v. Angelone, 176 F.3d 249 (4th Cir. 1999); Webster, 162 F.3d at 308;
Daugherty v. Dugger, 839 F.2d 1426 (11th Cir. 1988).
" See, e.g., Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 654-55 (1990) (holding that statutory
aggravating circumstances must provide guidance to the sentencer while limiting the number
of convicted murderers eligible for the death penalty and must be drawn in an objective
manner). But cf Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 950-51 (1983) (plurality) (holding that
"[o]nce the jury finds that the defendant falls within the legislatively defined category of
persons eligible for the death penalty... the jury then is free to consider a myriad of factors
to determine whether death is the appropriate punishment." (quoting California v. Ramos,
463 U.S. 992, 1008 (1983))). However, this decision also stated that aggravating factors
cannot be "so wholly arbitrary as to offend the Constitution." See id.
at 950-51.
56 See, e.g., Walton, 497 U.S. at 645-50; McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,304 (1987)
("In contrast to the carefully defined standards that must narrow a sentencer's discretion to
impose the death sentence, the Constitution limits a State's ability to narrow a sentencer's
discretion to consider relevant evidence that might cause it to decline to impose the death
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mitigator, but limiting its use as an aggravator, religion is treated precisely as other
character evidence.
V. BORN AGAIN PARDONS AND COMMUTATIONS
I close with a section devoid of case law. The problem I examine is the extent
to which a governor could adopt a policy of pardoning only those defendants who
profess Christianity. Two things seem clear to me: (1)such a policy would be
unconstitutional," and (2) it would not be amenable to judicial review. In regard
to enforceability, would we order a state to execute a Christian whose sentence had
been commuted? I do not think so. Would we say that the governor could not
commute another Christian's sentence until he had commuted two non-Christians?
Again, I do not think so.
Yet, the problem could be real. Undoubtedly, some death row inmates have
adopted religion while on death row, and have become far better human beings for
it.58 On the other hand, there are those who have become better people without
religion. 9 Rendering the former eligible and the latter ineligible to live is
obviously intolerable. If anyone has a solution to this problem, please let me
hear it.

sentence."); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393,394 (1987); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476
U.S. 1,4 (1986); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104,114-15 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978).
" .If
a person's status as a citizen cannot depend on her relationship with God, a fortiori,
her right to life cannot depend on her relationship with God. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38, 55 (1985).
"8 E.g., Billy Moore. See supra n.3 and accompanying.
'9See Evans v. Muncy, 498 U.S. 927,927-31 (1990) (mem.) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
In this case, Wilbert Evans, a convicted murderer of a police officer during an attempt to
escape, was initially sentenced to death based upon a Virginia jury's finding that Evans
posed a serious threat of future danger to society. While he was awaiting execution on death
row at Mecklenberg Correctional Facility, six death row inmates used crudely formed knives
to take twelve male prison guards and two female nurses hostage in an attempt to escape. See
id Evans was credited, by the testimony of the guards and the nurses, with saving the
guards' lives and with saving the nurses from rape. See id.
Notwithstanding, Governor
Wilder refused to pardon Evans or commute his sentence to life. There is no evidence that
Evan's heroism was religiously motivated.
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CONCLUSION

In this brief Essay, I have sought to set out a methodology for resolving
questions involving religion and the death penalty. Some of my solutions may be
controversial, such as allowing religious peremptory challenges and allowing
prosecutorial religious comment where properly cabined by the trial judge. But
the methodology of treating religion neutrally is salutary, and should guide the
courts.

